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1. Introduction 
 
The main economic argument in favor of local discretion to set tax rates is related to the 
decentralization theorem of Oates (1972, ch. 2). When local tax rates and service provision 
can adjust to varying spending preferences and cost conditions, a decentralization gain can be 
achieved compared to a situation with uniform service provision decided at the national level. 
Although the decentralization theorem has received (and still receives) large attention in the 
literature, there have been few attempts to measure the welfare gains from fiscal 
decentralization. I am only aware of the studies by Bradford and Oates (1974) and Greene and 
Parliament (1980). Both these studies calculate the efficiency loss from consolidation, i.e. the 
loss by moving from a situation with several local governments with different tax rates and 
service provision to a situation with a consolidated local government with uniform tax rate 
and service provision for all (previous) units. 
 
The source of the decentralization gain is variation in tax rates and service provision that 
reflect variation in demand for local public services and variation in the costs of providing 
these services. Variation in tax rates and service provision may be of concern in an equity 
context, and many countries have established fiscal equalization systems to limit the 
differences. An example is the wave of school finance equalization schemes in the U.S. The 
wave started in California and many observers consider the Californian system as a move to a 
fully centralized system of financing where school expenditures are effectively decided at the 
state level. The Californian case is analyzed empirically by Silva and Sonstelie (1995), 
Fernández and Rogerson (1999) and Loeb (2001). These studies focus on the trade-off 
between equalization and the level of school expenditures. The background is that in 
California the share of share of personal income going to public education fell by more than 
10% compared to the U.S. average after the introduction of centralized financing.1 However, 
these studies do not analyze the welfare loss associated with uniform expenditure levels. 
 
The studies of consolidation and the studies of the California school finance equalization do 
all analyze a move from decentralized to centralized financing. Moreover, they make the 
assumption that fiscal centralization means uniform service provision. There is then a clear 
trade-off between realization of welfare gains from decentralization and equality of service 
                                                          
1 However, it is not the case that all school finance equalization schemes in the U.S. states have contributed to 
lower levels of expenditures, see Murray, Evans and Schwab (1998) and Hoxby (2001). 
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provision: Decentralized financing leads to an efficiency gain because tax rates and services 
provision can adjust to variation in preferences and costs, but also to larger variation in 
service provision. However, the assumption of uniform service provision under centralized 
financing is questioned in the recent literature on fiscal federalism. A critical discussion of the 
assumption can be found in Oates (2005, 2006) who considers it as one of the main element in 
the so called first-generation theory of fiscal federalism. The second-generation theory departs 
from this assumption by providing explicit modeling of centralized decision making in a 
political economy context. Seabright (1996), Lockwood (2002) and Besly and Coate (2003) 
are important contributions in this new tradition. They all emphasize that centralization has 
the beneficial effect of internalizing externalities, but at the cost of less sensitivity to local 
preferences (accountability). Although many of the key insights from the first-generation 
theory go through also in the second-generation models, the comparison of centralized and 
decentralized systems becomes more complex. In particular the trade-off between realization 
of decentralization gains and equality of service provision becomes less clear when the 
assumption of uniformity is relaxed. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to compare how centralized and decentralized financing 
performs with respect to efficiency and equality in the context of Norwegian local 
governments. The Norwegian setting differs from the earlier analyses of decentralization 
gains (Bradford and Oates, 1974; Greene and Parliament, 1980) and the equalizing effects of 
centralized school financing (Silva and Sonstelie, 1995; Fernández and Rogerson, 1999; 
Loeb, 2001) in two important respects. First, the point of departure is not a decentralized 
system with local tax discretion, but a highly centralized fiscal system. Second, the 
centralized system is not characterized by uniformity, but by substantial variation in service 
provision that to a large extent is a result of the centralized system itself. Although I do not 
attempt to explain the variation within a particular political economy model of centralized 
decision making, the point of departure is in line with the second-generation understanding of 
centralized provision. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary institutional 
and empirical background. I pay particular attention to the evolution and the working of the 
centralized system of financing, and how the variation in service provision reflects the design 
of local tax financing and regional policy. The median voter model that is used to simulate a 
decentralized system with local tax discretion is presented in section 3, while section 4 gives 
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details about data and calibration. Calculations of the potential decentralization gain and 
variation in service provision under decentralized financing is presented in section 5. It is 
evident that decentralized financing may lead to substantial efficiency gains and, contrary to 
the wisdom from the first-generation theory, more equal provision of local public services. In 
section 6 I investigate whether the results from section 5 is robust to different assumptions 
about price and income elasticities for local public services. It appears that more elastic 
demand (both with respect to price and income) leads to more unequal service provision. 
However, the finding that decentralization reduces the variation in service provision 
compared to the present system of centralized financing is very robust. In section 7 I relax two 
of the assumptions underlying the analyses in sections 5 and 6. To be specific, I analyze how 
the efficiency gain is affected if decentralization also changes the aggregate level of local 
public spending and/or the cost of providing local public services. Finally, section 8 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Institutional and empirical background 
 
Norwegian local governments are important providers of welfare services like kindergartens, 
primary and lower secondary education, primary health-care, care for the elderly, and social 
services. Other important tasks are culture and infrastructure. The main revenue sources are 
taxes (45% of current revenues), grants from the central government (33%) and user charges 
(16%). Interest and other revenues account for the rest. 
 
At first glance the above figures picture a quite decentralized system of financing where local 
taxes and user charges make up more than 60% of total revenue. In order to get a more correct 
picture one needs to take a closer look at the tax financing. The data used in this study is from 
1996, in which the local governments could choose tax rates within an interval for four 
different taxes: the personal income tax, the personal wealth tax, the corporate income tax2 
and the property tax. However, since 1980 all local governments have used the maximum tax 
rates in income and wealth taxation. The regulated income and wealth taxes amount to more 
than 95% of local tax revenue. 
 
                                                          
2 The corporate income tax was abolished as a local tax in 1999 and reintroduced in 2005. 
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Property tax and user charges represent some limited autonomy to influence revenues.3 The 
property tax is a voluntary and exclusive tax for the local governments. However, it is not 
available to all since it is restricted to urban areas and certain facilities (first and foremost 
hydroelectric power plants). The property tax accounts for less than 5% of tax revenues, but is 
of great importance for individual local governments. In particular small local governments 
with hydroelectric power plants have very high property tax revenues per capita. User charges 
are applied for a wide range of services, but are limited to cover costs. 
 
The grant system consists of block grants (56%) and earmarked grants (44%). There are a 
large number of earmarked grants to promote particular activities, but it is the block grant 
system that is most important for the distribution of revenues across local governments. The 
block grant system has two main purposes, to equalize the economic opportunities across 
local governments and to promote regional policy goals. 
 
Equalization is achieved through tax equalization and spending needs equalization. The role 
of the tax equalization scheme is to reduce the differences in per capita revenue due to 
differences in tax bases. The tax equalization scheme that prevailed in 1996 guaranteed all 
local governments a minimum level of revenue of about 96% of average tax revenue. In 
addition, half of the tax revenues above 140% of the average were withdrawn to the state. It is 
also important to notice that only the regulated income and wealth taxes are subject to tax 
equalization, and that property tax revenues are not taken into account. This peculiarity of 
great of great advantage to the small local governments that have substantial property tax 
revenues per capita from hydroelectric power plants. 
 
Spending needs equalization is in place because equalization of per capita revenues is 
insufficient to equalize the economic opportunities for service provision. Local governments 
have different costs conditions due to differences in population size and settlement pattern. 
The age composition of the population affects the demand for important services like child 
care, education and care for the elderly. And social criteria like unemployment rate and 
divorce rate influence expenditures in social services like social assistance and child welfare. 
The spending needs equalization scheme compensates local governments with unfavorable 
cost conditions, expensive age structure and social problems. 
 
                                                          
3 User charges and property tax are analyzed empirically by Borge (1995, 2000) and Borge and Rattsø (2004). 
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While tax and spending needs equalization promotes equality of service provision, the 
elements motivated by regional policy create new differences. Through the regional policy 
elements small local governments and local governments in the northern part of the country 
receive extra grants. The design of the regional policy elements have changed over time. In 
the first years after the introduction of the block grant system in 1986 the regional policy 
elements were integrated in the tax and needs equalization, but during the 1990s they were 
separated out as specific grants and their regional policy purpose was clarified. The 
justification of the grants is that small local government and local governments in Northern 
Norway should be able to provide better services than the rest in order to promote 
employment and population growth. The grants are now named the Regional Grant (for local 
governments with less than 3000 inhabitants) and the Northern Norway Grant (for local 
governments in the three most northern counties). The Northern Norway Grant is paid out as a 
flat per capita amount (differentiated between the three northern counties), while the Regional 
Grant is a fixed amount per local government (differentiated by regional policy zone). In 
addition to the regional policy grants, local governments in rural areas benefit from the 
geographical differentiation of the pay roll tax. In 1996 the pay roll tax varied from 0% to 
14.1%.4 
 
Table 1: Correlation between gross private income and measures of local government 
revenue, 1996. 
 Taxes Grants Total revenue Service prov. 
Coeff. of correlation 0.18 -0.59 -0.28 -0.12 
Notes: All variables are measured per capita. 
 
The working of the Norwegian system of financing is broadly summarized in table 1 that 
shows the correlation between gross private income and several measures of local government 
revenue. The first thing to notice is the rather weak correlation between gross private income 
and local government tax revenue. The main explanation for this fact is that some small rural 
authorities, where private income is not particularly high, have substantial tax revenues 
(property tax and corporate income tax) from hydroelectric power production. There is a 
strong negative correlation between grants and private income, which mainly reflects tax 
equalization, spending needs equalization (small rural authorities have the highest spending 
needs) and the regional policy grants. When the grant system has done its job, private income 
and local government revenues (including taxes, grants and other revenues) are negatively 
                                                          
4 The intermediate rates were 5.1%, 6.4% and 10.6%.  
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correlated. This means that local governments where gross private income falls below the 
average tend to end up with local government revenue above the average.  
 
A high level of local government revenue is to some extent compensation for high spending 
needs. This is taken into account in last column of table 1, which shows the correlation 
between gross private income and an indicator of local service provision. The indicator of 
service provision is obtained by deflating the revenues by a cost index. The point of departure 
is the cost index used in the needs equalization system, which is based on variables such as 
population size, settlement pattern, the age composition of the population and social factors. 
Here the regional variation in the payroll tax is also taken into account. After deflating, there 
is only a weak negative correlation between gross private income and local government 
revenue. 
 
Table 2: The cross section variation in private disposable income, provision of local public 
services, 1996. 
 Min 1. quartile Median 3. quartile Max CV 
Private disp. income 0.685 0.874 0.931 0.995 1.292 0.109 
Local public services 0.722 0.894 0.991 1.143 3.814 0.271 
Notes: All figures except the coefficient of variation (CV) is measured as an index where the national average 
equals 1. The coefficient of variation is the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean. Private disposable 
income is median income net of taxes to local, county and national government. The unit of observation is local 
government. 
 
The weak correlation between gross private income and local public services may indicate 
that the system of financing performs well in terms of equalizing service provision. This is 
however, not the case. As can be seen from table 2, the coefficient of variation is nearly three 
times as large for local public services as for private disposable income.5 And whereas the 
max-min ratio is nearly six for local public services, it is less than 2 for private disposable 
income. When we take a closer look at the distribution, it appears that the higher coefficient 
of variation first and foremost is driven by a longer tail to the right for local public services.6 
 
There are basically three types of local governments that end up with high levels of service 
provision; small rural communities with substantial tax revenue from hydroelectric power 
plants, small rural communities that receive regional policy grants, and urban communities 
                                                          
5 Private disposable income is median income net of taxes to local, county and national government. Further 
description is given in section 4.  
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with high levels of income and wealth taxes. However, in the upper 10% of the distribution 
we only find local governments of the first two types. 
 
The present system of financing is the result of a gradual development over the last 100 years. 
The 1911 Tax Law is regarded as an important turning point. Then upper limits on the local 
tax rates were first introduced. The upper limits was of little importance until the early 1920’s 
when a period of deflation lead to a local government debt crisis. The tax base was reduced in 
nominal terms, but not the debt, and as a result many local governments were bailed out 
through grants from the central government. The long term effects of the bailouts were 
increased reliance on central government grants. The process towards increased centralization 
accelerated after WWII when the building of the welfare state was combined with local 
responsibility for important welfare services like education and health care. The substantial 
differences between local governments, where larger urban communities enjoyed the lowest 
tax rates and the best services, were considered to be in conflict with the policy goal of 
equalized provision of welfare services throughout the country. The national policy response 
was to narrow the interval for the local tax rates and to further increase the share of grants in 
local government financing. In the 1960s and 1970s most grants were of a matching type 
where the matching rates were differentiated between local governments on the basis of local 
spending needs and tax base. In the 1970s the matching rates were also used a mean to 
increase the tax rate in low-tax authorities. Local governments with tax rates below the 
maximum were “punished” by lower matching rates.7 Finally, all low-tax authorities gave in, 
and since 1980 all local governments have used the maximum tax rates in income and wealth 
taxation. 
 
I think this brief historical review is important to understand the present system and to answer 
the following question: Why do we not observe that even a single local government (in the 
upper tail of the distribution of local public services) chooses a tax rate below the maximum 
in income and wealth taxation? A popular explanation by some Norwegian observers is that 
the local governments are “underfinanced”, i.e. all local governments have desired tax rate 
above the maximum. In my view, the large variation in revenues and services provision across 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 The figures in table 2 are normalized by the weighted average. Moreover, private disposable income tends to be 
highest in larger urban communities. This explains why around 75% of the local governments have private 
income below the average.  
7 The information that the matching rates were actively used to punish low tax authorities is based on 
communication with civil servants that were involved in the process. 
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local governments documented in table 2 weakens this argument. My favorite argument is 
rather that local governments with high levels of service provision fear that the central 
government will respond to lower tax rates by reducing their grants, as it did in the 1970s.8 A 
lower tax rate is partly a signal for good economic conditions, and may thereby be a 
disadvantage in the “competition” for central government grants. In the short term grants that 
are distributed on the basis on judgments and/or negotiations may be affected, and in the 
longer term also the rules of the grant system. The analysis in this paper is based on the 
understanding that local tax autonomy is negligible, which is in line with the assumption that 
is often made in empirical studies analyzing the spending behavior of Norwegian local 
governments (e.g. Borge and Rattsø, 1995). 
 
3. A median voter model of local government tax and spending behavior 
 
Not many studies have attempted to estimate the allocative efficiency loss accosiated with 
centralized financing of local governments. The only two exceptions known by me are 
Bradford and Oates (1974) and Greene and Parliament (1980). Both focus on consolidations, 
i.e. they estimate the efficiency loss of moving from a situation with several local 
governments with different tax rates to a situation with a unified local government with 
uniform tax rate and service provision for all (previous) units. The recent U.S. literature on 
school finance equalization9 compares how centralized and decentralized financing perform 
with respect to the level of school expenditures and the variation across school districts, but 
do not calculate the allocative efficiency loss associated with centralized financing. 
 
Following Bradford and Oates (1974) and Greene and Parliament (1980), the counterfactual 
analysis is based on the median voter model. This is the workhorse of empirical analyses of 
local government tax and spending behavior and is surveyed by Inman (1979) and Rubinfeld 
(1987). The present analysis improves upon the earlier contribution by relying on a more 
stringent microeconomic foundation for the calculation of the efficiency loss. Whereas 
Bradford an Oates (1974) and Greene and Parliament (1980) calculate the efficiency loss as 
Harberger triangles based on the (uncompensated) demand curve for local public services, I 
use the concept of compensating variation. 
                                                          
8 Communication with local politicians and bureaucrats confirms this view.  
9 Examples include the econometric studies by Silva and Sonstelie (1995), Murray, Evans and Schwab (1998) 
and Hoxby (2001), and the analyses by Fernández and Rogerson (1999) and Loeb (2001) based on calibrated 
models. 
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The median voter model builds on strong assumptions. The issue must be one-dimensional, 
preferences must be single-peaked and the political system must either be direct democracy or 
two-party competition where the parties are purely office seeking. It can clearly be questioned 
whether these assumptions are fulfilled in the Norwegian context with multi-task local 
governments and multi-party competition. However, the studies by Aronsson and Wikström 
(1996) and Bergström, Dahlberg and Mörk (2004) apply the median voter model to the 
Swedish context, which is very similar to the Norwegian, and with reasonable results. The 
choice of the median voter model must nevertheless be considered as an approximation to 
reality. Moreover, the analysis in section 7 departs from the standard median voter model by 
allowing for overspending and cost inefficiency. 
 
The point of departure is a generalized10 CES utility function including private consumption 
(c) and local public services (q): 
 
( , ) c qu c q A
α γ
α γ= +                                                                                                        (1) 
 
Compared to the standard CES utility function, the Engel elasticities are allowed to differ 
from unity. Fernández and Rogerson (1999) use the same formulation in their simulation 
study of education finance reform in California. The median voter’s budget constraint can be 
written as  
 
Ipqc =+                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
where p denotes his tax price for local public services and I total resources available for 
private consumption and provision of local public services. The median voter’s desired 
allocation is found by maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint, an 
exercise that leads to the following first order condition: 
 
p
c
qA =−
−
1
1
α
γ
                                                                                                                    (3) 
                                                          
10 Compared to the standard CES utility function, the Engel elasticities are allowed to differ from unity. 
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The point of departure is the actual allocation without local tax discretion in 1996. The actual 
allocation ( aa qc , ) and the associated values of the tax price ( ap ) and total resources ( aI ) 
satisfy the budget constraint (2), but not the optimality condition (3). The obtained utility 
level is denoted au . 
 
Figure 1: The actual allocation and the simulated allocations under decentralized financing. 
 
Two sets of simulations are carried out, and they are both illustrated in figure 1. First, 
equations (2) and (3) are used to simulate the median voter’s desired levels of private 
consumption ( *c ) and local public services ( *q ) given the actual values of the tax price and 
total resources. More precisely, the following two equations 
 
a
aa
p
c
qA
Iqpc
=
=+
−
−
1
*
1
*
**
α
γ                                                                                                                (4) 
 
are solved with respect to *c  and *q .
11 The solution is used to infer how private consumption 
and provision of local public services are affected by more tax discretion. In the calculation of 
the local tax rate it is assumed that tax discretion is linked to the main local tax, the personal 
                                                          
11 The calibration of the parameters A,α  and γ  is discussed in Section 4. 
q 
c 
aI
**I  
aq  **q   *q  
*
**
c
c
 
*u
**au u=  ac
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income tax. In 1996 the uniform local income tax rate was 11.5%. The predicted tax rate with 
tax discretion ( *t ) is calculated as follows 
 
* 0.115
Gt
b
Δ= +                                                                                                             (5) 
 
where GΔ  is the change in local public expenditures per taxpayer and b  is taxable income 
per taxpayer (see also section 4). 
 
The utility level associated with the desired allocation ( *u ) is greater than or equal to the 
utility level attained in the actual allocation under centralized financing ( au ). Consequently, 
with local tax discretion the median voter could manage with a lower I and still obtain the 
utility level au . In the second set of simulations I calculate exactly how much I could be 
reduced. This is done by solving the following equations 
 
** **
** ** **
1
**
1
**
a
a
a
c qA u
c p q I
qA p
c
α γ
γ
α
α γ
−
−
+ =
+ =
=
                                                                                                             (6) 
 
with respect to **c , **q  and **I . Then the efficiency gain by more local tax discretion can be 
calculated as the difference between aI  and **I .  
 
4. Calibration and data 
 
The simulations must be based on specific values of the parameters of the utility function ( A , 
α  and γ ). As shown in the Appendix, the Cournot and Engel elasticities for local public 
services only depend on the parameters α  and γ  and the budget share for local public 
services ( pq
I
β = ). In the first set of simulations it is assumed that decentralized financing 
does not change the aggregate level of local public spending, but of course spending in 
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individual local governments are allowed to change. We can then use the aggregate actual 
budget share as an input in the calibration of α  and γ . 
 
There is a large empirical literature that relies on the median voter model in order to estimate 
elasticities of demand for local public services. The U.S. literature is summarized by Oates 
(1996). He reports that the representative estimate of the (Cournot) price elasticity is in the 
range –0.2 to –0.4, whereas the typical income elasticity is around 0.6. The U.S. estimates can 
not necessarily be carried over to the Norwegian institutional context. Since Norwegian and 
Swedish local governments to a large extent have the same tasks, two recent Swedish studies 
are of interest. The study by Aronsson and Wikström (1996) use a cross-sectional data set 
from 1990 and estimates the price elasticity to be around –0.5 and the income elasticity to be 
around 0.8. Bergström, Dahlberg and Mörk (1998), who use a panel data set covering the 
period 1988-1995, reach somewhat different results. They report price elasticities around –0.9 
and income elasticities around 0.6. Based on the U.S. and Swedish evidence I use a price 
elasticity of –0.4 and an income elasticity of 0.6 as a benchmark. In addition, sensitivity 
analyses using a vide range of elasticities will be provided. 
 
Given assumptions about price and income elasticities and the budget share for local public 
services, equations (A1) and (A2) in the appendix are used to calibrate the parameters α  and 
γ . Finally, the parameter A  is determined by iteration to ensure that aggregate spending 
under decentralized financing equals aggregate spending under the present centralized fiscal 
system. 
 
In the calculations the median voter is assumed to be the voter with median income. Available 
resources (Ia) are measured as the median voter’s private income ( my ) and his share of local 
government revenue. Local government revenue (R) includes taxes, grants, user charges and 
other revenue. One challenge in constructing aI  is to avoid double counting of local taxes and 
user charges paid by residents. Double counting of income and wealth taxes are avoided as 
they are included in local government revenue, but not in my  that is measured net of income 
and wealth taxes to local, county and central government. The remaining problem is property 
tax and user charges paid by households, which are not available in official statistics. They are 
not included in the tax statistics, and in the local government accounts they are mixed up with 
property tax and user charges paid by businesses. We use a survey data set of residential 
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property tax and user charges paid by households, collected by an organization called 
Norwegian Household Finances (Norsk Familieøkonomi), in order to avoid double counting 
of property tax and user charges. 
 
In the standard formulation, the median voter’s tax price consists of three terms: his tax share, 
the unit cost of local public services and a congestion term. Moreover, as shown by Bradford 
and Oates (1974) the share of the population that uses a particular service can be interpreted 
as a price term. Take education as an example and assume that voters care about expenditures 
per pupil. Then the share of pupils in the population affects the effective price of educational 
services, simply because the per capita cost of increasing educational spending per pupil by a 
certain amount is high when pupils constitute a large share of the population. Similarly, the 
share of elderly can be interpreted as a price term for care for the elderly. In the simulations 
we use the per capita cost index from the needs equalization system adjusted for the regional 
variation in the payroll tax. The cost index (denoted pi ) captures differences in unit costs 
(reflecting population size, settlement pattern, and the regional variation in the payroll tax), 
the age composition of the population, and social criteria. The tax price is measured as the 
product of the cost index and the ratio of median to mean income (to take account of variation 
in tax shares between taxpayers and that tax discretion is assumed to be linked to the personal 
income tax). Finally, provision of local public services ( aq ) is measured as total local 
government revenue per taxpayer deflated by the cost index. 
 
The operationalization of the variables can be summarized as follows 
 
, ,
m m
m m
a a a a
b b RI y R c y p pi q
b b pi
= + = = =                                                              (7) 
 
where R  is local government revenue per taxpayer, mb  is the median voters taxable income 
and b  is average taxable income per taxpayer. The number of inhabitants 17 years and above 
is used as a proxy for the number of taxpayers.12 The analysis is based on data for 1996 and 
includes 434 Norwegian local governments. Only the capital Oslo, which is both a local 
government and a county, is excluded. 
                                                          
12 The operationalization differs slightly from table 1 where the variables where measured per capita. However, 
the indicator of service provision aq is the same as in table 1 since both R  and pi  are measured per taxpayer. 
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5. Decentralization gain and variation in service provision under decentralized financing 
 
The simulation results for the benchmark case with price elasticity of –0.4 and income 
elasticity of 0.6 are presented in table 3. The calculated efficiency gain associated with local 
tax discretion is NOK 958 (USD 150) per taxpayer or NOK 2.9 billion NOK (USD 0.5 
billion) in aggregate.13 The gain amounts to 2.7% of local government spending. The 
marginal gain however, is sizeable. For each NOK that is transferred between the private and 
local public sectors because of tax discretion, there is a gain of NOK 0.32 (32%). 
 
Table 3: The benchmark case with price elasticity of –0.4 and income elasticity of 0.6. 
  
Efficiency gain  
Coefficient of variation 
Priv. disp. inc (c*)   Loc. pub. serv. (q*) 
Present system - 0.109 0.271 
Decentralized financing 958 0.134 0.077 
Note: The efficiency gain is measured in NOK per taxpayer. 
 
The simulations also show that decentralized financing may substantially reduce the 
inequality in provision of local public services. The coefficient of variation is reduced by 
nearly 20 percentage points, from 0.27 to 0.08. More equal service provision comes as the 
expense of slightly more variation in private disposable income (2.5 percentage points). The 
present system is characterized by larger regional variation in provision of local public 
services than in private disposable income. The simulations clearly indicate that decentralized 
financing will turn that around. 
 
Table 4: The cross section variation in private disposable income, provision of local public 
services, and income tax rate under decentralized financing 
 Min 1. quart. Median 3. quart. Max CV 
Private disp. income ( *c ) 0.777 0.897 0.944 1.023 2.075 0.134 
Local public services ( *q ) 0.805 0.907 0.949 0.993 1.330 0.077 
Local tax rate ( *t ) -74.7 3.9 10.1 13.2 16.6 1.400 
Notes: For private disposable income and local public services all figures except the coefficient of variation 
(CV) is measured as an index where the national average equals 1. The local tax rate is measured in %. 
 
Table 4 provides more information on the variation in private consumption and local public 
services under decentralized financing. For both private consumption and local public 
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services the bottom is lifted compared to the situation with centralized financing (see table 2). 
The long tail to the right is reduced for local public services. The tail to the right in available 
resources is now to a larger extent reflected in private consumption. 
 
The finding that local tax discretion leads to more equal service provision is in contrast to the 
first-generation theory of fiscal federalism that decentralized financing is associated with 
larger differences. It also differs from the finding in the school finance equalization literature 
that more centralized financing reduces the spending difference across school districts. The 
explanation for our result is that the starting point is not a centralized system that only 
promotes equalization, but a centralized system with large variation in service provision due 
to regional policy grants. In this respect it seems to be a fundamental difference between 
centralized systems initiated by court rulings that emphasize equalization only, and 
centralized systems that give the politicians discretion to promote other policy objectives also. 
 
Table 5: The correlations between the calculated tax rate ( *t ) and other variables, the 
benchmark case. 
 Private disposable 
income (ca) 
Local government 
revenue ( R ) 
Local public services 
(qa) 
Coeff. of correlation 0.15 -0.98 -0.95 
 
In order to provide a better intuition of the results, it is constructive to discuss how the 
personal income tax rate will vary with local tax discretion. Table 5 shows how the calculated 
tax rate correlates with the actual values of private disposable income, total local government 
revenue and provision of local public services. Calculated tax rates are strongly and 
negatively correlated with local government revenues and service provision, and weakly and 
positively correlated with private disposable income. Local governments with high levels of 
service provision and low private disposable income (within the present system) are expected 
to reduce their tax rates, whereas local governments with low levels of service provision and 
high private disposable income increase their tax rates. On the one hand, this explains why 
decentralization will reduce inequality in provision of local public services. But on the other 
hand, it also indicates less variation in private disposable income. Why do we then observe an 
increase in the coefficient of variation for private disposable income? The reason is that the 
changes in the income tax rate create “new” differences. Some local governments with very 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13 In the calculation of the aggregate efficiency gain it is assumed that gain to the median voter equals the 
average gain. 
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low levels of private disposable income within the present system are predicted to reduce their 
tax rates by so much that they end up with very high levels private disposable income, c.f. the 
long tail to the right in table 4. 
 
Table 4 also provides some key statistics on the distribution of the calculated personal income 
tax rate. It appears that the variation in the tax rate will be substantial, from a minimum of –
75% to a maximum of nearly 17%. The interquartile range is also large, nearly 10 percentage 
points. As much as 64 local governments come out with a negative tax rate in the calculations. 
These are all small communities in the periphery that either have high tax revenues from 
hydroelectric power plants or receive substantial regional policy grants. What type of local 
governments comes out with high tax rates? The 29 authorities that come out with a tax rate 
above 15% are medium-sized (13 000 inhabitants on average) urban communities. On average 
they have private disposable income slightly above the average and local service provision 
15% below the average. Under decentralized financing they would increase the tax rates to get 
a better balance between private disposable income (2% below the average) and local service 
provision (1% below the average). 
 
Table 6: The impact of decentralized financing for selected local governments. 
Local 
government 
Population Centralized financing 
  Pr. disp.       Local public 
   inc. (ca)         serv. (qa) 
Decentralized financing 
Tax rate      Pr. disp.    Local  public   
    (t*)           inc. (c*)    services (q*) 
Bykle      846 1.117 3.814 -74.7 2.075 1.330 
Hasvik   1 316 1.028 1.780 -14.1 1.255 1.071 
Bærum 97 034 1.289 1.348    9.5 1.316 1.222 
Røyken 15 143 1.142 0.878  15.7 1.090 1.075 
 
Table 6 provides further exploration of the results by focusing on four selected local 
governments.14 The first three of them are examples of the three types of local governments 
that have high levels of service provision within the present system (see section 2); small rural 
communities with substantial tax revenue from hydroelectric power plants, small rural 
communities that receive regional policy grants, and urban communities with high levels of 
income and wealth taxes. 
 
                                                          
14 The same four local governments were singled out by a gowvernment commission that proposed changes in 
the block grant system in 1996 (NOU 1996: 1). 
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Bykle is an example of a small rural community with substantial tax revenues from a 
hydroelectric power plant. Within the present system Bykle’s service provision is nearly 4 
times the national average, whereas private disposable income is 12% above the average. 
With a tax rate of -74.7% service provision would still be more than 30% above the average, 
whereas private disposable income would be more than twice the average and the highest in 
the country. 
 
Hasvik is located in the most northern county (Finnmark) and is an example of a small rural 
community with substantial grant revenue. It receives regional policy grant both because it is 
small in terms of population size (Regional Grant) and because of its geographical location 
(Northern-Norway Grant). In the present system Hasvik has service provision nearly 80% 
above the average and private disposable income slightly above the average.15 In the 
simulation of decentralized financing Hasvik comes out with a local income tax rate of -14%, 
but service provision is still more than 10% above the average. 
 
In my view Bykle and Hasvik illustrates that the levels of local public services and private 
disposable income are highly reasonable even if the tax rates are negative. The main 
justification is that both communities still will have service provision above the average. In 
practice however, negative tax rates will not be allowed. But local governments like Bykle 
and Hasvik can easily overcome this problem by providing market goods (or close substitutes 
to market goods) through the local government. By providing lap tops to all students Bykle is 
already involved in such practice.16  
 
Bærum exemplifies the third type of local government with high levels of service provision; 
urban communities with high levels of income and wealth taxes. Bærum is a suburb of Oslo 
with high-income inhabitants and much industrial activity that generates substantial revenues 
from the corporate income tax. Both private consumption and provision of local public 
services are clearly above the average. The tax rate will be somewhat reduced with 
decentralized financing, but not to the same extent as in Bykle and Hasvik since the initial 
composition of private consumption and local public services is more balanced. 
 
                                                          
15 The rather high level of private disposable income is mainly a result of lower income taxes (to the central 
government) in the most northern part of the country. 
16 If this practice is widespread, the above calculations may overestimate the efficiency gain associated with 
decentralized financing. 
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The last local government singled out in table 6, Røyken, is also located in the Oslo region. It 
is a typical suburb with a large share of commuters and little industrial activity. Private 
disposable income is 14% above the average, but the provision of local public services is 12% 
below. Røyken exemplifies communities that are rich in terms of private income, but poor in 
terms of local government revenue. With decentralized financing Røyken would increase its 
tax rate and strike a better balance between private consumption and local public services 
(both being above the average). 
 
A final remark to table 6 is that the composition of private disposable income and local public 
services differs significantly between the two rural communities (Bykle and Hasvik) and the 
two urban communities (Bærum and Røyken) under decentralized financing. The difference is 
that the provision of local public services is lower relative to private consumption in the two 
rural communities. The main reason for this difference in composition is that the cost of 
providing local public services (pi) is substantially higher in Bykle and Hasvik than in Bærum 
and Røyken.17 
 
6. Varying the price and income elasticities 
 
The simulation results discussed in section 5 were based on specific assumptions about price 
and income elasticities of local public services. However, both the efficiency gain and the 
variation in service provision under decentralized financing will be sensitive to these 
assumptions. Oates (1997) provides a general discussion of the relationship between the 
decentralization gain and the price elasticity of demand. He shows that the relationship 
depends on the source of the gain. More price elastic demand decreases the decentralization 
gain if the source is variation in demand, but increases the gain if the source is variation in 
costs. The intuition is for the first result is that more price elastic demand implies that private 
consumption and local public services become closer substitutes, and then the loss by inability 
to adjust service provision to local demand will be less. The intuition for the second the result 
is that it becomes more important to be able to increase consumption of a good that becomes 
relatively less expensive when the goods are close substitutes. 
 
                                                          
17 This price effect is exaggerated by the fact that median to mean income is also higher in the two rural 
communities. 
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The decentralization gains that are calculated in this paper reflect both variation in demand 
and variation in costs. It is therefore not obvious how more price elastic demand will affect 
the decentralization gain. If the variation in demand is the dominating source, more price 
elastic demand will reduce the decentralization gain. On the other hand, more price elastic 
demand will increase the decentralization gain if variation in costs is the dominating source. It 
should be emphasized that in our simulations (based on compensating variation), it is the 
Slutsky elasticity that is of importance for the size of the decentralization gain. Moreover, the 
Slutsky elasticity is affected by both the (Cournot) price elasticity and the income elasticity 
through the Slutsky equation. More price elastic demand will increase the absolute value of 
the Slutsky elasticity, whereas more income elastic demand will reduce it. No matter whether 
variation in demand or variation in costs is the dominating source of the decentralization gain, 
more price elastic demand and more income elastic demand will have opposite effects on the 
decentralization gain. 
 
Table 7: Varying the price elasticity keeping the income elasticity constant at 0.6. 
 
 
Price elasticity 
Calculated 
efficiency gain 
(NOK per taxp.) 
 
Coefficient of variation 
Priv. disp. inc ( *c )  Loc. pub. serv. ( *q )
-0.25 1 755 0.133 0.071 
-0.3 1 340 0.133 0.072 
-0.4    958 0.134 0.077 
-0.5    775 0.134 0.084 
-0.6    669 0.135 0.092 
-0.7    600 0.135 0.100 
-0.8    554 0.136 0.110 
-0.9    523 0.137 0.120 
-1.0    501 0.138 0.130 
-1.1    485 0.138 0.141 
-1.2    475 0.139 0.151 
-1.3    468 0.140 0.162 
-1.4    464 0.141 0.174 
-1.5    462 0.142 0.185 
 
The impacts of more price and income elastic demand are reported in tables 7 and 8 
respectively. It follows from table 7 that more price elastic demand will reduce the calculated 
decentralization gain, but at a diminishing rate. The interpretation of this finding is that 
variation in demand is the dominating source of the efficiency gain. Table 8 reveals that 
higher income elasticity increases the decentralization gain, thereby confirming the above 
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reasoning that more income elastic demand and more price elastic demand have opposite 
effects on the decentralization gain. 
 
Table 8: Varying the income elasticity keeping the price elasticity constant at –0.4. 
 
 
Income elasticity 
Calculated 
efficiency gain  
(NOK per taxp.) 
 
Coefficient of variation 
Priv. disp. inc ( *c )  Loc. pub. serv. ( *q )
0.3    888 0.145 0.055 
0.4    902 0.142 0.061 
0.5    924 0.138 0.068 
0.6    958 0.134 0.077 
0.7 1 006 0.130 0.087 
0.8 1 072 0.126 0.097 
0.9 1 163 0.122 0.108 
1.0 1 284 0.118 0.120 
1.1 1 447 0.114 0.131 
1.2 1 668 0.110 0.143 
 
More elastic demand (both with respect to price and income) seems to increase the differences 
in service provision across local governments. However, the finding that decentralized 
financing gives more equal service provision across local governments is very robust, as it 
holds for all pairs of price and income elasticities reported in tables 7 and 8. The finding (in 
the benchmark case) that the regional variation in service provision will be less than the 
variation in private disposable income is less robust. 
 
7. Overspending and cost efficiency 
 
The analyses in the previous sections were based on the assumptions that decentralized 
financing will not affect the aggregate level of local public spending. However, there is no 
reason to believe that the two regimes will produce exactly the same level of spending. What 
guidelines can be derived from existing theories regarding the level of spending? If we go 
back the first-generation theory, the typical justification for uniform service provision under 
centralized financing is that the center has imperfect information about local preferences and 
costs. Because of this information problem, service provision under centralized financing will 
deviate from the median voter outcome under decentralized financing. In general the center 
will choose too high levels of service provision in some local governments and too low levels 
in others. As a consequence, the theory does not provide any clear prediction on whether 
aggregate spending under decentralized financing will be higher or lower compared to 
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centralized financing. In this case it is not a bad compromise to assume equal aggregate 
spending in the two regimes, but the likely consequence is that the decentralization gain is on 
the conservative side. 
 
Within the second generation theory there are several models that predicts excessive spending 
under centralized financing. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) assume Leviathan governments 
that seek to maximize the size of their budgets. There is then a tendency that public spending 
grows too large, but this tendency is constrained under fiscal federalism and decentralized 
decision making because the tax base becomes more elastic. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson 
(1981) emphasize the role of pork barrel politics under centralized financing. They argue that 
a norm universalism may develop in assemblies with geographical representation, and that 
there is a tendency for excessive spending because each representative only takes his district’s 
share of the costs into account. There is also a related literature on soft budget constraints 
where the basic argument is that local spending and deficits may be too high because local 
governments are expected to be bailed out by the central government (see Rodden, Eskeland 
and Litvak 2001). 
 
Not only the level of spending, but also the unit cost of providing local public services may be 
affected by the system of financing. Hoxby (1999) develop a model to compare centralized 
financing (social planner) of school districts and decentralized financing with property 
taxation. She emphasizes how a local property tax helps to solve the underlying information 
problem (that the effort of the service producing agency can not be verified). With local 
property taxation the effort of the school district is indirectly made verifiable because it is 
capitalized into property values and thereby affects the budget of the agency. It is shown that 
decentralized property taxation can attain about the same level of cost efficiency as a social 
planner armed with implausibly much information. 
 
Table 9 illustrates the additional gains by decentralized financing if centralized financing 
leads to overspending or reduced cost efficiency. Overspending is technically modeled by 
letting the parameter A in the utility function of the median voter be determined such that 
aggregate spending under decentralization is lower than the aggregate level of spending in the 
present centralized system (which is kept fixed). The upper part of table 9 reports results for 
different values of A and different levels of overspending with centralized financing. The 
simulations confirm the understanding that the baseline assumption of equal aggregate 
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spending in the two regimes yields a conservative estimate of the decentralization gain. With 
central overspending of 10% the decentralization gain is increased by nearly 30%, and with 
overspending of 20% the gain is increased by more than 150%. However, small levels of 
overspending (less than 5%) seem to have a negligible effect on the decentralization gain.18 
 
Table 9: Additional gains by decentralized financing, the benchmark case 
Source of additional gains Decentralization gain  
(NOK per taxpayer) 
Overspending with centralized financing  
     0 %   958 
     5 %   966 
     10 % 1232 
     15 % 1741 
     20 % 2473 
  
Increased cost efficiency with decentralization  
     0 %   958 
     1 % 1239 
     2 % 1507 
     3 % 1761 
     4 % 2001 
     5 % 2227 
 
The lower part of table 9 shows how the decentralization gain increases if decentralized 
financing also is associated with more cost efficient provision of local public services. 
Technically, local tax discretion is combined with a reduction in the cost index for provision 
of local public services (pi). It appears that small increases in cost efficiency have large 
effects on the calculated decentralization gain. A 1% increase in cost efficiency under 
decentralization will increase the decentralization gain by nearly 30%, and with a 4% increase 
the gain is more than doubled. 
 
The simulations presented in table 9 emphasize overspending and reduced cost efficiency as 
additional problems with centralized financing. However, these arguments can easily be 
reversed. There is a substantial literature that emphasizes beneficial effects of centralized 
financing and tax limits. The U.S. literature on property tax limits is summarized by McGuire 
                                                          
18 Although it is likely, it is not necessarily the case that the decentralization gain increases with central 
government overspending. The reason is that local governments are affected differently. Overspending tends to 
increase (reduce) the gain for local governments that reduce (increase) the tax rate under decentralized financing. 
In the case analyzed here small levels of central overspending will actually reduce the decentralization gain 
compared to the benchmark case. The decentralization gain is minimized when overspending is around 2.5%, 
and it is then slightly less than 930 NOK per taxpayer. 
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(1999) who emphasizes that tax limits can be understood as a voter response to Leviathan 
type governments. She argues that the U.S. evidence is in favor of the Leviathan model, and 
that tax limits and centralized financing may reduce overspending associated with 
decentralized financing. It may also be argued that decentralized financing reduces cost 
efficiency. Toma and Toma (1980) consider a game between a local government and a service 
producing agency (with preferences for high costs or low effort). They show that local tax 
discretion softens the budget constraint of the agency and thereby reduces cost efficiency. In a 
similar type of model Courant and Rubinfeld (1981) show that tax limits may reduce public 
sector wages and increase voter welfare. Poterba and Rueben (1995) report evidence that tax 
limits may reduce overspending and costs. They document that U.S. states with effective 
property tax limits had a slower growth in local public sector wage premium during the 
1980s, and also that they to some extent had lower employment growth in the local public 
sector. 
 
Table 10: Problems with decentralized financing, the benchmark case 
Source of additional gains Decentralization gain  
(NOK per taxpayer) 
Overspending with decentralized financing  
     0 %  958 
     5 %  832 
     10 %  482 
     15 %  -57 
     20 % -755 
  
Reduced cost efficiency with decentralization  
     0 %  958 
     1 %  670 
     2 %  384 
     3 %    98 
     4 % -187 
     5 % -472 
 
Table 10 shows how the decentralization gain is modified if decentralized financing is 
combined with overspending and lower cost efficiency. It appears that decentralized 
overspending of 5% has a negligible effect on the decentralization gain. The net gain is 
reduced by 50% if excessive spending equals 10%, becomes close to zero at 15%, and is 
turned into a substantial loss at 20%. Lower cost efficiency has a substantial effect on the 
decentralization gain. A 1% reduction in cost efficiency will reduce the gain by 30%. And if 
the reduction in cost efficiency is more than 3%, the decentralization gain is turned into a loss. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
 
Compared with most countries the Norwegian system of financing local governments is 
highly centralized. Grants make up a substantial part of revenues and local taxes are highly 
regulated by the center. The development of the system was motivated by a desire to equalize 
service provision throughout the country. The paper analyzes possible consequences of more 
decentralized financing with local tax discretion. The analysis is carried out within a 
calibrated median voter model. In contrast to the conventional wisdom in the first-generation 
theory of fiscal federalism, I find that decentralized financing will lead to more equal 
provision of local public services. The explanation for this finding is that the starting point is 
not a centralized system that only promotes equalization, but a centralized system that also 
promotes regional policy goals. In addition substantial efficiency gains can be obtained if 
service provision and taxes are allowed to adjust to variation in preferences and costs. 
 
In the benchmark case variation in service provision is reduced by two third and the 
decentralization gain is nearly NOK 1000 per taxpayer. Although the variation in service 
provision increases with more price and income elastic demand, the finding that 
decentralization leads to more equal service provision compared to the present centralized 
system of financing is very robust. The size of the decentralization gain is somewhat sensitive 
to alternative assumptions about elasticities, overspending and cost efficiency. In particular 
the simulations indicate that cost efficiency considerations may be of great practical 
importance to the choice of fiscal system. If decentralization increases cost efficiency by 3%, 
the efficiency gain is doubled. On the other hand, if decentralization reduces cost efficiency 
by 3%, the efficiency gain is negligible. It is an important topic for future research in fiscal 
federalism to analyze how decentralization affects cost efficiency. 
 
The findings of the paper basically reflect the working of the present centralized system of 
financing, and in particular centrally determined tax and grant design that allow for high 
levels of revenues and service provision in rural communities. This design is motivated by a 
desire to promote employment and population growth, and a possible objection to the analysis 
in this paper is that possible beneficial effects on employment and population growth are not 
taken into account in the median voter model. However, it is important to notice that the 
simulations do not redistribute resources between local governments; it only reallocates 
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resources between the private and the local public sector within each community. And it is not 
obvious that high levels of local public services promote regional development more 
efficiently than low taxes. 
 
Appendix 
 
By differentiating equations (2) and (3) the following expressions for the Cournot (ε ) and 
Engel (E) elasticities for local public services can be derived: 
 
1
( 1) (1 )( 1)
βαε β α β γ
−= − + − −                                                                                        (A1) 
1
( 1) (1 )( 1)
E αβ α β γ
−= − + − −                                                                                       (A2) 
 
It appears that the elasticities depend on α , γ  and β , where a a
a
p q
I
β =  is the actual budget 
share for local public services. The parameters α  and γ  can be calculated from (A1) and 
(A2) based on specific assumptions about the elasticities of demand and the actual budget 
share for local public services (
a
aa
I
qp
). 
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